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I.

INTRODUCTION

In the early 1800s, the American West was in a period of transition.
With waves of settlers came new and unique legal conflicts. Some of
these conflicts settled around the right to use water in the West. The
hydrologic, climatic, and geologic conditions of the West created
unique water allocation issues that the common law riparian systemthe prevailing water rights regime in the eastern United States-simply
For instance, the common law riparian
could not accommodate.
system allowed only those persons owning real estate abutting a
2
natural watercourse to obtain a property right in water. In the West,
however, this limitation proved unrealistic as rivers were scarce and the
Moreover, farmers west of the 100th
need for water universal.
meridian lacked the luxury of watering their crops exclusively with
rain. Thus, notwithstanding the misguided Gilpinistic notion that
"rain follows the plow," western farmers were often forced to transport
river water great distances to irrigate their crops. Finally, whereas
eastern rivers experienced only small seasonal deviations in flow,
snowmelt from the West's great mountains caused its rivers to swell
mightily in the spring. By late summer, however, the relentless heat,
and sparse rainfall, parched these same rivers. Western irrigators
needed a property rights regime tailored to these exigencies of the
western water users turned to the prior
Consequently,
arid West.
6
appropriations doctrine.
The central tenet of the prior appropriations doctrine, "first in
time, first in right," developed in the mining camps of the early
nineteenth century. These hearty prospectors, however, were not the
only appropriators of western waters. A version of prior appropriation
8
developed independently in the acequias of the Southwest. Native
Americans, Spanish explorers, and Mormon settlers also adhered to
9
the principle of "first in time, first in right." Above all, in allocating
such a scarce resource, western water users, then as now, desired
certainty, and the prior appropriations doctrine served this purpose
well.
Today, however, this certainty is threatened. In the past few
decades, after years of almost unequivocal deference to state law, the
federal government has exhibited a growing interest in the allocation

1. See Charles T. DuMars & A. Dan Tarlock, Symposium Introduction: New Challenges

to State Water Allocation Sovereignty, 29 NAT. REsOURCESJ. 331, 331 (1989).

2.
3.
4.
5.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See D. Craig Bell & Norman K. Johnson, State Water Laws and Federal Water Uses:

The History of Conflict, the Prospectsfor Accommodation, 21 ENVTL. L. 1, 4 (1991).

6. See id.
7. See id.; DuMars & Tarlock, supra note 1, at 332.

8. See DuMars & Tarlock, supra note 1, at 332.
9.

See Bell &Johnson, supra note 5, at 4.
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of western water."° Federal environmental statutes such as the Clean
Water Act and the Endangered Species Act are mounting an everincreasing assault on once incontrovertible state water rights."
Inevitably, litigation results from this collision between vested state
water rights and federal environmental regulation. 2
Whenever the government's regulatory action impacts property
rights, it potentially implicates the takings clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 3 The takings clause
can thus be a powerful weapon in the legal arsenal of a state water
user's attempt to resist federal environmental regulation that threatens
the exercise of his water right, especially in light of Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council.'4 Nevertheless, the degree of protection
actually afforded to holders of state water rights by the takings clause
has remained an enigma. The desire of both the federal government
and appropriators to settle conflicts and avoid potentially damaging
precedent best explains this phenomenon. 5
However, federal
environmental legislation that continues to encroach on the allocation
of western water, will undoubtedly force owners of impacted water
rights to test head on the waters of Supreme Court takings
jurisprudence. 6 When they do, the courts face yet another obstacledetermining the degree of protection afforded water rights by the
takings clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Supreme Court takings jurisprudence has evolved in the context of
10. See Kristen Dorrity, Comment: Will FederalEnvironmentalRegulation Be Permitted
to Infringe on State Vested Water Rights?, 11 UCLAJ. ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 113 (1992). See
generally DuMars & Tarlock, supra note 1.
11. SeeBennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (Endangered Species Act); O'Neill v.
United States, 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1995) (Endangered Species Act); Riverside
Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985) (Clean Water Act); United
States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp 1126 (E.D. Cal. 1992)
(Endangered Species Act); Jan G. Laitos, Water Rights and Water Quality: Recent
Developments, 23 COLO. LAw. 2343 (Oct. 1994) [hereinafter Laitos, Recent Developments];
J. David Aiken, Balancing Endangered Species Protection and Irrigation Water Rights: The
Platte River Cooperative Agreement, 3 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES. J. 119 (1999);Jan G.
Laitos, Water Rights, Clean Water Act Section 404 Permitting,and the Takings Clause, 60 U.
COLO. L. REv. 901 (1989) [hereinafter Laitos, Clean Water Act]; A. Dan Tarlock, The
Creation of New Risk Sharing Water Entitlement Regimes: The Case of the Truckee-Carson
Settlement, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 674 (1999); Todd H. Votteler, The Little Fish that Roared:
The EndangeredSpecies Act, State GroundwaterLaw, and PrivateProperty Rights Collide Over
the Texas Edwards Aquifer, 28 ENVTL. L. 845 (1998).
12. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 11.
13. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922).
14. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
15. SeeAiken, supra note 11, at 158; Tarlock, supra note 11.
16. The courts are fully aware of the looming takings issue where federal
environmental legislation threatens to curtail water rights as it has, albeit tangentially,
already arisen. See, e.g., Madera Irrigation Dist. v. Hancock, 985 F.2d 1397 (9th Cir.
1993).
Moreover, adjudicating conflicts resulting from the collision of federal
environmental regulation and private interests with a distinctly western flavor is
nothing new to the courts. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great
Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (timber); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985)
(mining); Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1988) (livestock); Mountain States
Legal Found. v. Hodel, 799 F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1986) (grazing).
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real property." A water right under the prior appropriations doctrine,
however, is a unique property interest with its own distinct attributes.
Thus, applying Supreme Court takings jurisprudence in the water
rights arena results in a conceptual discord. 8 This article attempts to
resolve this discord and ascertain the extent to which the takings
clause of the Fifth Amendment protects appropriative water rights
from curtailment or proscription by federal environmental regulation.
Part II addresses the historical development of the prior
appropriations doctrine and the unique nature of a property right
obtained by applying water to a beneficial use under this system. Part
III discusses relevant Supreme Court takings jurisprudence. This part
pays particular attention to the framework used by Justice Scalia to
resolve the takings issue in Lucas, and the way in which post-Lucas
decisions have interpreted the "so-called nuisance exception."' 9 Part
IV applies Supreme Court takings jurisprudence to the taking of a
water right and addresses the issues created by the conceptual discord,
which occurs when one applies a real property based takings
framework to the proscription of a water right. Ultimately, this part
concludes that, under certain circumstances, federal environmental
regulation-such as the Endangered Species Act-that prohibits the
exercise of a decreed appropriative right, may violate the Fifth
Amendment as a taking of private property withoutjust compensation.
focuses on Colorado, as it is the "purest" appropriation
The 2article
0
state.
II. THE NATURE OF A PROPERTY RIGHT IN WATER
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that the government shall not take private property for a "public use,
As Professor Sax points out, this
without just compensation."2
constitutional provision affords protection to private property, of
which "there is only one such category. 2 While this may be true, it
would be a great oversimplification to state that a water right 2is3
invariably private property protected by the Fifth Amendment.
Pursuant to Lucas, the degree of protection afforded to a private
property right by the Fifth Amendment varies greatly depending on
the nature of the interest at stake.2 ' Thus, in order to evaluate the
relationship between Supreme Court takings jurisprudence and a
17. Cf.Laitos, Clean Water Act, supra note 11, at 903.
18. Cf. Douglas L. Grant, Western Water Rights and the Public Trust Doctrine: Some
Realism About the Takings Issue, 27 ARIz. ST. L.J. 423, 427-34 (1995).
19. SeeJoseph L. Sax, Rights that "Inherein the Title Itself': The Impact of the Lucas Case
on Western Water Law, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 943 (1993).
20. Cf. Laitos, Clean Water Act, supra note 11, at 905.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
22. Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution,Property Rights and the Future of Water Law, 61 U.
COLO. L. REv. 257, 261 (1990).
23. Bell & Johnson, supra note 5, at 4-5; Laitos, Clean Water Act, supra note 11, at
903.
24. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-31 (1992).
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water right, it is axiomatic to analyze the precise contours of the
property interest held by western appropriators. Prior to dissecting
the nature of a property right in water, however, one must determine
what law defines that right.
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PRIOR APPROPRIATIONS LAW

Allocation of water under the prior appropriations doctrine best
served the unique needs of western water users. 25 "Spurred by the
need to obtain water for domestic, irrigation and mining uses, the
settlers did not await federal leadership, but instead developed their
own laws, customs and judicial decisions recognizing priority of
"26
appropriation, linked to beneficial use of the water ....
Accordingly, upon admittance to the union, western states adopted the
local custom of the settlers, "first in time, first in right," to resolve
disputes over precious water in the arid west.27 Even before state law
legitimized appropriative rights, "the federal government by silent
acquiescence approved the rule-evidenced by local legislation,
judicial decisions, and customary law and usage-'that the acquisition
of water by grior appropriation for a beneficial use was entitled to
protection.'"
Then, "in a series of acts providing for disposition of parts of the
public domain... [Congress] accorded formal recognition to water
rights acquired through local laws and customs and 'rejected the
alternative of a general federal water law."'
In passing the Desert
Land Act of 1877, Congress had severed, in effect, water from the
disposition of the public domain. 0 Consequently, whereas federal
legislation disposed of public lands, state law allocated water in the
West." Thus, "the legislation and judicial decisions of the arid-land
states [are] the test and measure of private rights in and to the nonnavigable waters on the public domain."32
After California Oregon Power Company, 3 western states
understandably concluded that they would enjoy exclusive control of
water resources in perpetuity.34 In fact, some states rights advocates
argued that most federal claims to western waters were constitutionally
suspect.35 Notwithstanding federalist rhetoric, however, the Commerce
25. See Bell &Johnson, supra note 5.
26. State v. S.W. Colo. Water Conservation Dist., 671 P.2d 1294, 1305 (Colo. 1983).
27. See Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446-49 (1882); see also Bell &
Johnson, supra note 5, at 4.
28. S.W Colo. Water Conservation, 671 P.2d at 1305 (quoting Cal. Or. Power Co. v.
Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 154 (1935)).
29. Id. (quoting United States v. City & County of Denver 656 P.2d 1, 7 (Colo.
1982)).
30. See Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
31. See id.
at 162.
32. Id. at 155.
33. See Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935).

34. DuMars &Tarlock, supra note 1, at 334.
35. Id.
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and Property Clauses do provide the federal government with some
legitimate interests in water allocation issues." For instance, even the
most ardent supporter of state primacy cannot deny the legitimacy of
the federal government's navigation servitude under the commerce
power. Additionally, in United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation
Co., 8 the Supreme Court concluded that the Property Clause gave the
federal government a proprietary interest in western waters. 9 This
interpretation eventually culminated in Winters v. United States,4 o and its
legacy of federal reserved rights. 4 Kansas v. Colorado,42 the premier of
the equitable apportionment doctrine, has also been seen as an attack
on state sovereignty over water.43 Despite federal reserved rights, the
navigation servitude, and equitable apportionment, western water
resources did remain primarily the exclusive province of the states for
almost a century until federal environmental legislation enacted in the
late 1960s and early 1970s began to encroach on appropriators'
rights. 44 As a result, the precise property interest one obtains by
application of water to a beneficial use under the prior appropriations
doctrine should derive exclusively from state law. Given the analytical
framework established by Justice Scalia in Lucas, this fact has
evaluating whether federal regulation has
significant import when
45
right.
water
a
"taken"
B.

EXPLORING PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS IN WESTERN WATERS UNDER
STATE LAW

According to the United States Supreme Court, absolute rights-in
property or otherwise-are rare, "and water fights are not among
Nevertheless, a water right "is among the most valuable
them. 4
property rights known to the law. 4 7 Once a water right vests, "it
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 62
(1913).
38. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
39. Id. at 703; see also DuMars & Tarlock, supra note 1, at 335.
40. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
41. DuMars & Tarlock, supranote 1.
42. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
43. See DuMars & Tarlock, supra note 1, at 334-35. But cf. DuMars & Tarlock, supra
note 1, at 334-35. DuMars and Tarlock point out that the equitable apportionment
doctrine utlimatley "strengthened state sovereignty because the western states were
induced to firm up the rights of their citizens to interstate waters through the
negotiation of compacts." Id. at 335.
44. Cf DuMars & Tarlock, supra note 1, at 332, 336. Of course, unlike its
abstention in the area of non-navigablewaters, the federal government has maintained
a substantial interest in the navigable waters of the United States. See United States v.
Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 69 (1913). Whether or not the
stream from which an appropriator diverts his water is navigable, may therefore have a
significant influence on the outcome of takings litigation. See infra Part IV.B.3.ii.
45. See infra Part IV.B.3.ii.
46. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 510 (1945).
47. White v. Farmers' Highline Canal & Reservoir Co., 43 P. 1028, 1030 (Colo.
1896).
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becomes a constitutionally protected property interest which can be
of this right,
sold, leased, or otherwise alienated."" The precise Snature
41

however, has been the subject of some confusion.
recently described a Colorado water right as:

Justice Hobbs

[A] right to use beneficially a specified amount of water, from the
available supply of surface water or tributary groundwater, that can be
captured, possessed, and controlled in priority under a decree, to the
exclusion of all others not then in priority under a decreed water
right. A water right comes into existence only through application of
the water to the appropriator's beneficial use; that beneficiil use then
becomes the basis, measure, and limit of the appropriation. 0

A water right, then, is usufructuary.5 It does not grant ownership to a
specific corpus of water.5 2 Instead, a water right gives its holder the
right to use a specific volume of water from a particular source. 3 The
value of a water right, therefore, derives
solely from its priority date
4
and the security provided thereby
The water right is quasi-exclusive in that it is not tied to the place
of use.55 In addition, the water right "is not subordinate to any land,
but independent thereof and of equal dignity therewith." 56 Thus,
although treated in some regards as real property,57 the right is in fact
an incorporeal hereditament."'
When reduced to possession by diversion into an artificial
structure, such as a ditch or an off-stream reservoir, water takes on
characteristics of personal property, and the corpus itself is private
property.
Otherwise, the corpus of water itself is "publici juris." °

Accordingly, while appropriators have a private property right to use
the water, the "ownership of the resource itself remains in the

48. Bell &Johnson, supra note 5, at 5.
49. See West End Irrigation Co. v. Garvey, 184 P.2d 476 (Colo. 1947); Talcott v.
Mastin, 79 P. 973 (Colo. Ct. App. 1905); VRANESH'S COLORADO WATER LAW 30 (James
N. CorbridgeJr. & Teresa A. Rice eds., revised ed. 1999);John Undem Carlson, Report
to GovernorJohn A. Love on Certain Colorado Water Law Problems, 50 DENV. L.J. 293, 306
(1973).
50. Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 53 (Colo.
1999) (citations omitted).
51. 1 SAMUEL C. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES § 276, at 288-89 (3d.
ed. 1911).
52. See Bell &Johnson, supra note 5, at 5 n.8.
53. Id.
54. See Navajo Dev. Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374, 1380 (Colo. 1982) (citation
omitted).
55. See DuMars & Tarlock, supra note 1, at 332.
56. 1 WIEL, supra note 51, § 287, at 303.
57. See VRANESH, supra note 49, § 2.1, at 30.
58. See 1 WIEL, supra note 51, § 287, at 303-04.
59. See id. § 277, at 290; VRANESH, supra note 49, § 2.1, at 30.
60. See 1 WIEL, supra note 51, § 277, at 290; cf Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland
Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 163-64 (1935) ("What we hold is that following the act of
1877, if not before, all non-navigable waters then a part of the public domain became
publicijuris,subject to the plenary control of the designated states...").
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public."' Defining this relationship requires delicately balancing the
states' interest in ownership of the water-which often manifests itself
as the protection of public values-against the right of appropriators
to use the water for a beneficial use. As the prior appropriations
doctrine developed, this balance tended to shift in favor of the states'
This trend was not, however, universal among western
interests.
states, and today the exact balance reached by each state varies. 3
C.

BALANCING PUBLIC OWNERSHIP VERSUS PRIVATE USE

In Article XVI, section 5 of the Colorado Constitution states the
relationship between appropriators' usufructuary right and the state's
sovereign interest as follows: "The water of every natural stream, not
heretofore appropriated, within the state of Colorado, is hereby
declared to be the property of the public, and the same is dedicated to
the use of the people of the state, subject to appropriation as
hereinafter provided."6 4 The complimentary constitutional provision
referred to declares that "[t]he right to divert the unappropriated
waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied."'65
In People v. Emmert, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed the
interaction between these two constitutional provisions, albeit in an
unusual context.
In Emmert, the defendants were enjoying a float trip down the
Colorado River, a non-navigable waterway. Along one segment of the
defendants' trip, the Ritschard Cattle Company Ranch bounded the
river on both sides.68 Ritschard also owned the bed of the stream.
Over Ritschard's objections, the defendants passed through his
ranch. Consequently, the State prosecuted the defendants for third
degree trespass and the trial court convicted them.7 ' They appealed
61. Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 54 (Colo.
1999) (citation omitted).
62. See Bell &Johnson, supra note 5, at 4-5.
63. See id. at 6-23. See generally Douglas L. Grant, Public Interest Review of Water Right
Allocation and Transfer in the West: Recognition of Public Values, 19 ARIz. ST. L.J. 681
(1987). The rapid expansion and modification of the public trust doctrine is probably
the most prominent example of ways in which western states have increasingly asserted
their ownership interest in water to reflect public interest values. See Nat'l Audubon
Soc'y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 977
(1983); Joseph L. Sax, The Limits of Private Rights in Public Waters, 19 ENVTL. L. 473
(1989).
64. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
65. Id.§6.
66. People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1979).
67. Id. at 1026. The navigability of the Colorado River was never litigated. Instead,
the parties stipulated that the river was non-navigable. As such, under Colorado law,
the owner of the land abutting both sides of a watercourse is deemed to be the owner
of the entire bed (where opposing banks of a non-navigable river are owned by
different parties, each owns to the thread of the stream). See id.
68. Id.
69. Id; see supra note 67.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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the conviction to the Colorado Supreme Court. Ultimately, the court
rejected the various rationales other state courts had employed to
permit the public to use waters overlying private land for recreational
purposes and held that the public had no right to the use of waters
overlying private lands for recreational purposes without the consent
of the owner."IHow the court arrived at this conclusion is of particular
interest.
The defendants argued that because section 5 of Article XVI of the
Colorado Constitution grants ownership to the public of the state's
waters, they had a constitutional right to float through Ritschard's
property."
The court disagreed, noting that the common law
principle "cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum," is so ingrained in
Colorado's law of property that the General Assembly had codified it.74
The statute provides that "'[t]he ownership of space above the lands
and waters of this state is declared to be vested in the several owners of
the surface beneath." 75 Thus, an owner of the bed of a non-navigable
stream has the exclusive right to control the waters above it subject
only to applicable constitutional and statutory limitations. 76 The court
then necessarily addressed whether the right of public ownership
provided by Article XVI of the constitution constituted such a limit on
the private rights of the landowner.7
Initially, the court noted that the title of Article XVI, "Mining and
Irrigation," inherently limited its scope. 78 The title of section 5,
"Irrigation," is similarly indicative of the drafters' intent.79 The court,
therefore, concluded that the "provision of the Colorado Constitution,
upon which the defendants so heavily rel[ied], simply and firmly
establishe[d] the right of appropriation in [Colorado]." 0 Thus, the
court interpreted section 5 of the Colorado Constitution as dedicating
the state's waters to the people for the purpose of appropriation."'
The court reveals the impact of this interpretation in its discussion
of Day v. Armstrong,2 a Wyoming case which reached the opposite
result under essentially identical facts. In contrast to Emmert, Day held
that "the public has the right to the recreational use of the surface
waters of non-navigable streams bounded by private property."" Unlike
section 5 of article XVI of Colorado's Constitution, the comparable
Wyoming constitutional provision declares the waters of the state as

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027, 1030 (Colo. 1979).
Id. at 1027.
Id.; see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 41-1-107 (2000).
Id. (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 41-1-107 (1973)).
Id.
Id. at 1027-28.
People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Colo. 1979).
Id.
Id.; see also Hartman v. Tresise, 84 P. 685, 686 (Colo. 1905).
Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1030 (GrovesJ. dissenting).
Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961).
Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1028.
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property of the public and does not refer to appropriation at all.84
Moreover, the title of article 8 of the Wyoming Constitution, which
contains this section, is "Irrigation and Water Rights."85 The title of the
section states bluntly that "Water is state property." 6 As the Colorado
Supreme Court noted in Emmert, these differences have caused some
commentators to regard the Wyoming Constitutional provision "as a
stronger statement of the public's right to recreational use of all
surface waters."'
Finally, the Colorado Supreme Court reflected on the import of
In89
Wyoming's central administration of state water allocation.
Wyoming, a person acquires water rights by obtaining a state permit.
The permitting process allows the state to deny an application if
granting the permit would detrimentally affect the public interest.90 . In
contrast, the Colorado Constitution's mandate that "[t]he right to
divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream.., shall never
be denied," 9' results in only minimal state control over water
allocation.9 2 Consequently, under Colorado law, there is currently no
device that could prevent appropriation of the state's waters on public
interest grounds.
Whereas other western states have afforded substantial protection
to public interest values through both statutory" and judicial vehicles,
the balance in Colorado has remained largely in favor of private
appropriators. Most notably, the Colorado Supreme Court appears to
have rejected any relevance of the public trust doctrine to water
In fact, public interest considerations have only
allocation.9'
84. WYO. CONsT. art. 8, § 1.
85. Id. art. 8 (emphasis added).
86. Id. art. 8, § 1.
87. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1028.
88. See id. at 1028-29 n.2.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
92. See Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1028 n.2.
93. See ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080 (b)(1)-(8) (Michie 1998);ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §
45-153 (West 1994); CAL. WATER CODE § 1225 (West 1971 & Supp. 2000); HAw. REv.
STAT. § 174C-49(4) (1993); IDAHO CODE §§ 42-203A, -203C (Michie 1996); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-302, -311(2) (1999); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 533.325, .370(3),
534.050(1) (Michie 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5-1, -6, -7, 72-12-3(e) (Michie 1997);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-04-02, -06 (1995); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 537.130, .170(4) (1988);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 46-1-14, -2A-9, -5-10, -6-3 (Michie 1999); TEX. WATER CODEANN.
§§ 11.121, .134(b) (3) & (4), .147, .150, .152, .1271, .1311 (Vernon 2000); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 73-3-1, -8(1) (1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 90.03.250, .03.290, .44.050,
.44.060 (West 1992); WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-3-930 to -932, -4-503 (Michie 1999).
94. See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal.
1983); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085
(Idaho 1983); Dep't of State Lands v. Pettibone, 702 P.2d 948 (Mont. 1985); United
Plainsmen Ass'n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D.
1976); State v. Lain, 349 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. 1961); Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137
(Wyo. 1961).
95. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1028; see also Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colo.
Water Conservation Bd., 901 P.2d 1251, 1263 (Colo. 1995) (MullarkeyJ. dissenting)
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adulterated the purity of Colorado's prior appropriations system in two
respects. First, Colorado Revised Statute section 37-92-102(3) allows
the Colorado Water Conservation Board to appropriate waters for the
purpose of maintaining minimum stream flows in order to "preserve
the natural environment to a reasonable degree."" Second, judicial
recognition that "'maximum utilization' does not require a 'singleminded endeavor to squeeze every drop of water' from a water source"
rules which seek to achieve
allows the
97
46 state engineer to promulgate
The significance of this latter
"optimum use" of the resource•.
doctrine, however, is the subject of great uncertainty.
Of course, no one has the right to waste a valuable resource such
as water; therefore, an appropriator must divert his allotted water by a
reasonably efficient means.9 This limitation on waste did not develop
to protect public interest values though. On the contrary, it primarily
serves to protect the interest of the appropriators themselves. In the
arid West, where water is scarce, yet indispensable, a prohibition on
waste is simply a necessary element of any enduring water allocation
regime.
As private property, a water right is indeed sui generis. So little
similarities exist between an appropriative water right and a fee
interest in land that it is almost counterintuitive to refer to both as
private property. A fee owner of real estate acquires a bundle of rights
that includes the right to possess, use, exclude others from, and
dispose of the property in any manner he sees fit.99 On the contrary,
the primary sticks in the bundle of rights an appropriator of water
acquires under the prior appropriations doctrine are priority and
use.19 0 Where a water right is usufructuary, a fee estate grants
Despite these differences, when an
ownership of the corpus.
appropriator claims that his water right has been "taken" by federal
environmental regulation, a court will turn to a takings doctrine
developed almost exclusively in the context of real estate to determine
whether the taking requires just compensation.

("This court has never recognized the public trust doctrine with respect to water.").
But cf id. at 1256-57 (concluding that COLO. REv. STAT § 37-92-102(3) imposes a
fiduciary duty on the Colorado Water Conservation Board to exercise its statutory
power of appropriation to preserve the natural environment to a reasonable degree
for the people of the State of Colorado).
96. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2000); Aspen Wilderness Workshop Inc., 901 P.2d
at 1257.
97. Bell &Johnson, supra note 5, at 18 (quoting Alamosa-LaJara Water Users Prot.
Ass'n v. Gould, 674 P.2d 914, 935 (Colo. 1983)); see also Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d
986, 994 (Colo. 1968); City of Colo. Springs v. Bender, 366 P.2d 552, 556 (Colo. 1961).
98. SeeA-B Cattle Co. v. United States, 589 P.2d 57, 61 (Colo. 1978).
99. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982);
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979).
100. Laitos, Clean Water Act, supra note 11, at 906-07.
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III. MODERN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
A. PRE-LucAs TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
Although somewhat oversimplified, modern taking jurisprudence
prior to Lucas'°' reveals three instances in which the court will likely
find a taking has occurred. First, a permanent physical occupation of
private property by the government is a taking and as such requires
just compensation. 02 Second, governmental regulation, which reduces
the economic value of private property to zero, is also a categorical
taking. O3 The third category encompasses those cases to which neither
of the above "bright line rules" applies. 0 4 Takings claims in this
category will succeed when government regulation has gone "too
far." 05
To further muddle any attempts at logical analysis of this last
category, the Supreme Court has "generally eschewed any 'set formula'
for determining how far is too far, p referring to 'engag[e] in...
Nevertheless, the Court has
essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.""
consistently considered certain factors in determining whether a
Although rarely individually
regulation has gone "too far."
determinative, collaboratively, these factors serve as an acceptable
indicator of the likely outcome of a takings claim.'Y7 These factors are:
"(1) the economic impact of the regulation on the property owner; (2)
the extent to which the regulation interferes with the owner's
(3) the character of the
investment-backed expectations;...
° and (4) whether the government regulation
governmental action,"'O
"secures 'an average reciprocity of advantage' to everyone
concerned."'°
The past century of Supreme Court takings jurisprudence reveals
only one other arguably "bright line rule." The rule as explained by
the Supreme Court is that "'harmful or noxious uses' of property may
be proscribed by government regulation without the requirement of
compensation." 0 The Supreme Court's broad interpretation of

101. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
102. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 438; KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 181; United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946).
103. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987).
104. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-26 (1978).
105. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
106. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978)) (internal citations omitted).
107. See Grant, supra note 18, at 426.
108. Id; see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124-26; Florida Rock Indus., Inc.
v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 21, 24 (1999).
109. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018 (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922)).
110. Id.at1022.
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"public purpose""' and its expansive view of the police power
predicate this rule."' Thus, in Penn Central Transportation Co., Is the
Court held that "where the State 'reasonably conclude[s] that the
'health, safety, morals, or general welfare' would be promoted by
prohibiting particular contemplated uses of land, compensation need
not accompany prohibition."' For "[g]overnment hardly could go on
if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished
without paying for every such change in the general law.""' 5 However,
whether a regulation that renders property valueless requires
compensation is the focus of Lucas and is, therefore, addressed
comprehensively in Part III.C.
Because of the ad hoc nature of the inquiry, determining whether
the government has gone "too far" under the third category has always
been, and is currently, a crapshoot.
Thus, when a federal
environmental regulation curtails or proscribes an appropriator's
water right, he stands the best chance of succeeding in his takings
challenge by pursuing just compensation under one of the
"categorical" takings theories. ' 6 Consequently, the remainder of this
Part focuses on those Supreme Court cases interpreting the categorical
taking theories.
B.

PHYSICAL INVASION

Until 1922, the Supreme Court interpreted the takings clause of
the Fifth Amendment to require compensation only when the
government directly appropriated private property such that "a
practical ouster of [the owner's] possession" had occurred.' 7 Since its
advent, however, regulatory takings jurisprudence has generally
overshadowed the physical invasion category. Nevertheless, in Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,' 8 the Supreme Court
demonstrated its unyielding commitment to the principle that the
government must compensate one who suffers a loss from a physical
invasion of his property at the hands of the government.
In Loretto, the plaintiff landlord challenged a New York law that
required him to allow installation of a cable company's facilities on his
111.

See, e.g., Haw. Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984).
112. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). In Berman, the Court concluded
that the values represented by the public welfare "are spiritual as well as physical,
aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine
that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean,
well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled." Id. at 33.
113. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 125.
114. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1023 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 125 (1978)); see also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-35
(1987) (noting that the Supreme Court, while not promulgating any set standard for
determining what constitutes a legitimate state purpose has allowed "a broad range of
governmental purposes and regulations" to serve as such).
115. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
116. See supra notes 102-03.
117. Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878).
118. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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property." 9 The equipment at issue consisted of thirty-six feet of cable
less than one-half inch in diameter and directional taps four inches by
four inches by four inches. Together "the cable and boxes occup[ied]
only about one-eighth of a cubic foot of space."'20 Notwithstanding the
small size of appropriation and the complete absence of any injury to
the plaintiff, the Court held that "any permanent physical occupation is
a taking" that requires compensation.
The Court reasoned that direct appropriation of one's property is
"perhaps the most serious form of invasion."022 Furthermore, a direct
appropriation is of such unique character that "it is a taking without
regard to other factors that a court might ordinarily examine " 12- or
"the public interests that it may serve." r ' In the case of a physical
invasion, "the government does not simply take a single 'strand' from
the 'bundle' of property rights: it chops through the bundle, taking a
slice of every strand.' 25 The court continued:
[A]n owner suffers a special kind of injury when a stranger directly
invades and occupies the owner's property.... To require, as well,
that the owner permit another to exercise complete dominion
literally adds insult to injury. Furthermore, such an occupation is
qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property...
since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or
nature of the invasion.
The rule may not be limited to occupation of land. In United States
v. Causby,1 7 the Court found a physical invasion, and hence a taking, of
an easement in property. 28 In Causby, the Court reasoned that the
United States by flying its airplanes so frequently and immediately
above the plaintiff's land, committed "an intrusion so immediate and
full enjoyment of the property
direct as to subtract from the owner's
29
it."
of
exploitation
his
limit
to
and
Additionally, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States,3 the Court found a
physical invasion where the United States government exercised its
navigation servitude to require public access to a privately owned
pond. 3 ' The Court reasoned that by exercising the servitude in such a
fashion the Government took the pond owner's right to exclude-a
right which is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 421.
Id. at 443 (Blackman,J. dissenting).
Id. at 432.
Id. at 435.
Id. at 432.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
Id. at 435 (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979)).
Id. at 436.
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
Id. at 264-65.
Id.
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).

131.

Id. at 172-73.
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that are commonly characterized as property.",3 1 In dicta, however, the
Court has intimated that because requiring an easement of passage is
not a permanent physical occupation of property, it does not
constitute a per se taking, and therefore the balancing test analysis is
appropriate.
Nonetheless, the more the "character of the
governmental action" resembles a permanent ghysical occupation, the
more likely a court will find a taking occurred. '
The only uncertainty remaining in this branch of Supreme Court
takings jurisprudence is whether a temporary physical invasion
constitutes a categorical taking. An extensive discussion of the issue in
Loretto would seem to indicate that a temporary physical invasion is not
of the same character as a permanent physical occupation, and should
therefore, be analyzed pursuant to the ad hoc factual inquiry of the
third category. 35 However, the Supreme Court's pronouncement in
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles 3 that the Fifth Amendment requires compensation for even
temporary deprivations of private property did not inform this
discussion.'37 Consequently, the Court never has addressed directly the
import of First English to the physical occupation doctrine. Thus, as
evidenced by Justice Scalia's discussion of the physical invasion
doctrine in Lucas, it is unclear whether one should treat a temporary
physical invasion as a per se taking or analyze it pursuant to the
balancing test. 138 Even if the Court declines to treat temporary physical
invasions as per se takings, Kaiser Aetna gives the "unique character" of
physical invasions, notwithstanding
their limited duration, great weight
3
under the balancing test. 1
C.

THE ABSENCE OF ECONOMIC VIABILITY, NUISANCES, AND THE LUCAS

FRAMEWORK
As discussed in Part III.A, governmental regulation that reduces
the economic viability of private property to zero requires
compensation. Yet, if the government regulates private property in
order to proscribe a nuisance, this act does not require compensation.
Thus, when governmental regulation meant to restrain a nuisance
leaves property valueless, application of both "bright line rules" causes
an apparently irreconcilable conflict. The Lucas framework attempts
132. Id. at 176.
133. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982).
134. See id. at 434 (citation omitted).
135. See id. at 428-34.
136. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
137. Seeid. at 307.
138. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), Justice Scalia
himself seems unsure of First English's effect on the physical invasion doctrine. In
stating the rule, he does not limit this per se takings category to permanent physical
invasions. See id. at 1015. Yet, he does acknowledge parenthetically that the category
has historically included only permanent physical invasions. See id.
139. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
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to resolve this conflict.
David Lucas purchased two beachfront lots on an island off the
coast of South Carolina for $975,000.40 Lucas intended to erect single
family homes on each lot. 4' Two years after purchasing the lots,
however, the South Carolina legislature enacted the Beachfront
Management Act ("Act"). The Act effectively required Lucas to leave
the lots in their natural state.'42 Consequently, Lucas challenged the
43
compensation.'
legislation as a taking of private property withoutjust
The trial court held the Act's permanent ban on construction
rendered Lucas's property valueless and entitled him to
compensation.'14 The South Carolina Supreme Court, relying on the
nuisance exception, reversed. The supreme court reasoned the Act
necessarily preserved a threatened public resource, and since the
construction prohibitions purpose was "to prevent serious public
harm," the Act as applied to Lucas's property did not require
45 The
compensation, notwithstanding total economic deprivation.
United States Supreme146Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict
between the holdings.

First, Justice Scalia upheld the legitimacy of a per se rule requiring
compensation where government regulation renders private property
valueless. 14 He reasoned that the "total deprivation of beneficial use
is, from the landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a physical
appropriation."

48

Moreover, Justice

Scalia

argued

that when

government regulation requires land to be left in its natural state,
thereby leaving its owner without any "economically beneficial or
productive options for its use," there exists "a heightened risk that
form of49
private property is being" impermissibly conscripted in "someharm."
public
serious
mitigating
of
guise
the
under
public service
Justice Scalia then turned his attention to the nuisance exception.
Justice Scalia reasoned that, conceptually, whether a statute
proscribes a nuisance or confers a benefit is simply a matter of
5°
perception, because often, they are two sides of the same coin.'
Accordingly, the "[h]armful or noxious use" analysis employed by the
Court in the past was "simply the progenitor of [its] more
contemporary statements that 'land-use regulation does not effect a
5
taking if it 'substantially advance [s] legitimate state interests."" The
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 1006-07.
Id. at 1007.
See id. at 1008-09.
Id. at 1009.
Id.

145. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1010 (1992).

146. Id.
147.
148.

See id. at 1016-19.
Id. at 1017.

149. Id. at 1018.
150.

Id. at 1024.

151.

Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1023-24 (1992) (quoting Agins v.

Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
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takings clause, though, places affirmative
limits on the
noncompensable exercise of the police power.152 Thus, in order to
balance the legitimate need for noncompensable exercises of the
police power against the equally potent interest of private property as
manifested in a per se compensation rule for total economic
deprivations, Justice Scalia concluded:
Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all

economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only
if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's
estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title
to begin with ....Any limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated
or decreed ...but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions
that background principles of the State's law of property and
nuisance already place upon land ownership....The "total taking"
inquiry we require today will ordinarily entail.., analysis of, among
other things, the degree of harm to public lands and resources, or
adjacent private propert, posed by the claimant's proposed activities,
the socia[ value of the claimant's acuvities and their suitability to the
locality in question, and the relative ease with which the alleged harm
can be avoided thro}uh measures taken by the claimant and the
government ...alike.

Although Justice Scalia's compromise appears at first glance to be
an ingenious resolution of the competing interests at stake, it created a
number of new issues while leaving some existing questions
unanswered.
1.

Defining the Property Interest: When, Where, and How?

Pursuant to the Lucas framework, state law determines whether
governmental regulation that deprives property of all economic
viability requires compensation. Thus, one must first ascertain the
degree of protection state law affords the particular property interest
at issue. This inquiry involves identifying any inherent limitations
placed on the particular property interest by existing state property
and nuisance law. Two questions arise, however, when one attempts to
put theory into practice.
First, at what point in time should one survey state law to identify
inherent limitations on title?
While Lucas explicitly states that
inherent limitations may be implicit as well as explicit, it does not

clearly address the timing issue. 5 4 Language in Justice Scalia's
opinion155 "suggest[s] focusing on when the present owner obtained
title, [however,] there remains the question of what the owner
obtained at that date."

156

For instance, "[does] the present owner

152. See id. at 1026.
153. Id. at 1027, 1029, 1030-31 (internal citations omitted).
154. Id. at 1027-30.
155. Language in the opinion refers to "an owner's 'title to begin with' and 'the
understandings of our citizens regarding the content of, and the State's power over,
the bundle of rights that they acquire when they obtain title to property."' Grant,
supra note 18, at 445.
156. Id.
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obtain only whatever rights then-existing precedents would give, or
[does] the present owner obtain the same rights the original
appropriator had despite intervening changes in property law?" 5 7 If a
buyer obtains only the former, an additional takings question arises
because any limitations placed on the title by intervening changes in
state property law to which the buyer, but not the seller, is subject
impairs the seller's ability to dispose of the land, and hence impairs its
value.'58 However, if the seller himself were not subject to intervening
157. Id.
158. See id. at 445-46. The Supreme Court may soon revisit the timing issue.
Recently, the Court granted certiorari to Palazzolo v. State, 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000),
cert. granted, 69 U.S.L.W. 3002 (Oct. 10, 2000) (No. 99-2047). In Palazzolo, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court, concluded, arguably in dicta, that no per se taking can occur
where the regulation that deprives the property of all beneficial use predates the
owner's acquisition of the property. See Palazzolo, 746 A.2d at 716-17. Palazzolo
argued that it should be "immaterial whether the regulation predates the claimant's
ownership of the land." Id. at 716. The court disagreed, primarily for three reasons.
First, Palazzolo's position "violate[d] the Supreme Court's dictate in Lucas, instructing
reviewing courts to determine whether a landowner originally possessed the right to
engage in a particular use." Id; see also City of Virginia Beach v. Bell, 498 S.E.2d 414,
417 (Va. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 826 (1998) (where the value reducing regulation
predates the landowner's acquisition of the property, "the 'bundle of rights' which
[the landowner] acquired upon obtaining title to the property did not include the
right to develop the lots without restrictions"). Second, "Palazzolo's argument that the
time of acquisition is irrelevant could lead to pernicious 'takings claims' based on
speculative purchases in which an individual intentionally purchases land, the use of
which is severely limited by environmental restrictions, and then seeks compensation
from the state for that 'taking."' Palazzolo, 746 A.2d at 716. Finally, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court pointed out that adopting Palazzolo's argument would cause
regulatory takings to be treated differently than physical takings, "a result that is
clearly contrary to the Court's statement in Lucas that the two types of takings should
be accorded similar treatment by courts." Id. The Court explained:
For instance, under Palazzolo's interpretation, any new purchaser of land
would be able to claim that a pre-existing regulation resulted in a taking for
which that new owner was owed compensation. This is clearly different from
the treatment given to physical takings, in which only the owner at the time
of the taking is owed compensation.... Regardless of whether the
government physically takes property in the form of an easement or
promulgates regulations restricting the property's use, all subsequent owners
take the land subject to the pre-existing limitations and without the
compensation owed to the original affected owner.
Id. at 716-17.
On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court may not even address this
aspect of the Rhode Island Supreme Court's opinion. The Rhode Island Supreme
Court, albeit briefly, also considered the relationship between conceptual severance
and total economic deprivation. See id. at 714-17. This issue alone could be the
subject of the United States Supreme Court's review. Alternatively, the Supreme
Court could address the Rhode Island Supreme Court's application of the Penn Central
balancing test. Instead of balancing Palazzolo's investment back expectations against
the other two Penn Central factors-the economic impact of the regulation and the
character of the government action-the Rhode Island Supreme Court held
Palazzolo's complete lack of investment backed expectations dispositive because the
value reducing regulation predated Palazzolo's acquisition of the property. Id. at 717.
Lower courts are split on whether interference with investment backed expectations
can serve as an independent ground for a taking or whether it must be balanced
against the other Penn Central factors. See generally JAN G. LAITOS, LAW OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS PROTECTION: LIMITATIONS ON GOVERNMENTAL POWERS § 11.05 (Supp. 2001-1).
In any event, how the United States Supreme Court will address the Rhode Island

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 4

regulations that render the property valueless, one would probably
analyze this new takings question under the balancing test instead of
the Lucas framework because the seller would presumably receive
some measurable benefit from continued possession of the property.159
Second, while it is clear from Lucas that the analysis of the property
interest at issue should be under state law, how that analysis should
proceed is less certain. For instance, lower courts have split as to
whether one should look only to state common law in assessing
inherent limitations of title or whether "background principles" of
state property law include "a tradition of regulatory legislation. ' o
Moreover, although Justice Scalia acknowledges "[t]here is no doubt
some leeway in a [state] court's interpretation of what existing state
law permits""" "a State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private property
into public property without compensation."1 6' Elaborating on this
limitation, Scalia flatly states that a state court's interpretation and
16 3
application of relevant precedent must be "objectively reasonable."
However, the means by which a reviewing court would assess whether a
court found an inherent title limitation pursuant to an "objectively
reasonable application of relevant precedents," is itself a mystery.6 4
2.

Incorporating Change

The Lucas framework has been criticized as inflexible because

Supreme Court's treatment of the timing issue-if it addresses it at all-remains to be
seen.
159. See Grant, supra note 18, at 445. Professor Laitos points out that under this
framework, though:
The Supreme Court has encouraged courts to not recognize an owner's
investment-backed expectations as protected by the Takings Clause when the
owner has either actual prior notice of the law alleged to cause the taking, or
constructive notice of the likelihood of future laws that might interfere with
the owner's investments or expectations. If either condition is present, it is
said that the owner does not have a protectable investment-backed
expectation. This is because one who makes decisions about property with
actual or constructive knowledge about present or future restrictions on its
use has (1) assumed the risk of loss of value, or (2) presumably paid less for
the property (on account of the restrictions), such thatjust compensation for
a taking would confer a windfall on the owner.
LAITOS, supra note 158, § 11.10[B] at 11-32 to 11-32.1.
See also Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); see generally LAITOS, supra note 158, §§ 11.05, .10.
160. LAITOS, supra note 158, § 9.03[C]; see also id. § 4.04.
161. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1032 n.18 (1992).
162. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980).
163. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032 n.18.
164. See Grant, supra note 18, at 440-42. Professor Grant argues that:
A later opinion by Justice Scalia indicates that the issue may have two
components: (1) Was the court "creating the doctrine rather than describing
it"? (2) If the doctrine in fact "exists," do the facts support its application to
the dispute? The opinion also suggests that a state court's "vacillations on the
scope of [a] doctrine" from case to case will "reinforce a sense the court is
creating the doctrine rather than describing it."
Id. at 440 n.105 (quoting Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1212 n.4
(1994) (ScaliaJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari)). See also William W. Fisher III,
The Trouble with Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1393, 1407 (1993).
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determining whether a taking has occurred by resorting to an
investigation of title under historic state law precedent does not
165 However,
incorporate new information or changing social values.
this criticism is not entirely accurate. Justice Scalia uses as an example
of a noncompensable taking the hypothetical of a state requiring a
nuclear power plant owner "to remove all improvements from [his]
land upon discovery that the plant sits astride an earthquake fault.""
Thus, the Lucas framework allows a state to proscribe all economically
viable use of property where new information transforms a once
innocuous use into a nuisance. More troublesome though is Justice
Scalia's acknowledgment that under traditional nuisance law,
"changed circumstances ... may make what was previously permissible
no longer so." 167 The Restatement (Second) of Torts provision cited by
Justice Scalia deals exclusively with the changing character of a
particular locality.'68 Thus, the question remains-does the allowance
for changed circumstances encompass changing social values? One
commentator has suggested that "[p]erhaps the notion is that the
form of harm can change under new technology or new knowledge,
of changing values." 9
and owners must bear that risk, but not the risk
3. Conceptual Severance 7 °
The Lucas framework only applies if a regulation deprives an
owner of all "economically feasible use" of his property. Yet, to assess a
regulation's economic impact, one must define the property against
which the regulation operates. 7 ' "In virtually every case, the breadth
of the definition [the court] chooses will determine whether the
This is commonly referred to as the
regulation stands or falls."'
73 In Lucas, Justice Scalia acknowledged the
denominator problem.
uncertainty this issue creates 4 but refrained from offering a solution.
165. See Sax, supra note 19, at 944-45; Joseph L. Sax, The ConstitutionalDimensions of
Property: A Debate, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 23 (1992) [hereinafter Sax, Constitutional
Dimensions].
166. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
167. Id. at 1031.
168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 827 cmt. g (1979).
169. Sax, ConstitutionalDimensions, supra note 165, at 31 n.34.
170. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the
Jurisprudenceof Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1667, 1676 (1988).
171. See Fisher, supra note 164, at 1402; see generally LAITOS, supra note 158, §§
11.04[B], .08 (citing cases).
172. See Fisher, supra note 164, at 1402. Courts have split on defining the relevant
parcel. See generally LArros, supra note 158, §§ 11.04[B], .08 (citing cases). Compare
Forest Props., Inc. v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 56 (1997) (property defined such that
economic viability of parcel was not reduced to zero and court found no taking under
balancing test) with Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (property defined such that economic viability of parcel reduced to zero and
court found a taking had occurred under the Lucas framework).
173. Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1180.
174. See Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web
of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1369, 1375 (1993).

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 4

He did however, propose that:
[t]he answer to this difficult question may lie in how the owner's
reasonable expectations have been shaped by the State's law of
property-i.e., whether and to what degree the State's law has
accorded legal recognition and protection to the particular interest
in land with respect to which the takings claimant alleges a
diminution in (or elimination of) value.

D.

5

is

LOWER COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF LUCAS

Quite a few cases since Lucas have been forced to address the issues
raised therein. 7 '
Three cases extensively discussing the Lucas
framework were all brought in the Court of Claims after the Corps of
Engineers denied the plaintiffs a section 404 permit to develop
wetlands under the Clean Water Act: Forest Properties, Inc. v. United
States, ' Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 78 and Florida Rock
Industries v. United States.'79 Of these three, Forest Propertiescontains the
most extensive discussion of the issues left unanswered by Lucas.
In Forest Properties, the plaintiffs were developing property adjacent
to Big Bear Lake in California.'8"
In conjunction with this
development, the Clean Water Act required that the plaintiffs obtain a
section 404 permit to dredge and fill lakebottom property. 8 ' When the
Corps of Engineer denied this permit, the plaintiffs brought an inverse
condemnation suit against the federal government.8 ' The court began
its analysis by stating definitively that the Lucas framework prohibits
consideration of federal law in determining whether a pre-existing
limitation existed on the claimant's title.'
Next addressing the
denominator problem, the court noted that the Federal Circuit has
advocated defining the relevant parcel pursuant to a "flexible
approach, designed to account for factual nuances." 4 The court then
recited a nonexclusive list of factors, repeatedly used in resolving the
denominator problem. The factors the courts should consider
include:
the degree of contiguity, the dates of acquisition, the extent to which
175. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992).
176. See generally, LAITOS, supra note 158, §§ 11.03-.10.
177. Forest Props., Inc. v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 56 (1997).
178. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
179. Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 21 (1999).
180. See ForestProps., 39 Fed. Cl. at 60-67.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 67.
183. See id. at 70-71; see also Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1538 (Fed. Cir.
1996). In Forest Properties, the court found that Preseault"explicitly stated that 'Lucas
provides no such support' for the proposition that 'background principles' can
include federal law." ForestProps., 39 Fed. Cl. at 71.
184. Forest Props., 39 Fed. Cl. at 73 (quoting Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States,
28 F.3d 1171, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
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the parcel has been treated as a single unit, the extent to which the

protected lands enhance the value of remaining lands, and ...how
the economic expectations of the claimant, with respect to the parcel
at issue, have shaped the owner's actual and projected use of the
property.
Under this analysis, the court concluded that the relevant parcel
included not only the "taken" lakebottom property, but also the
developable upland property as well. 8 6 Consequently, because some
economic viability of the relevant parcel remained, the court applied
the balancing test to the takings claim and ultimately found no taking
had occurred. 87
The government has not always been so lucky. In Loveladies
88
the Federal Circuit upheld a 2.6 million-dollar award after
Harbor,1
denial of a section 404 permit prohibited the plaintiffs from
developing 12.5 acres of wetlands. Unlike ForestProperties,the court in
Loveladies determined the relevant parcel consisted only of those acres
for which the plaintiffs' sought the permit, and consequently, found a
total deprivation of economically feasible use of the relevant parcel. 8 9
In so concluding, the court paid credence to the importance of owner
expectations, stating that "[i]t is important to note that Loveladies
purchased the property with the intent to develop it long before these
particular state and federal regulatory programs came into effect." 90
Accordingly, the court concluded that "land developed or sold before
the regulatory environment existed should not be included in the
denominator."' 91
Lower courts, including the Loveladies court, have also addressed
the nuisance question. As Justice Blackmun pointed out, however,
"[t]here is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law
than that which surrounds the word 'nuisance."" 2 In accord with this
criticism, a consistent treatment of the nuisance question has yet to
emerge, due partly to varying state nuisance doctrines. In Loveladies,
the court decided whether New Jersey's law of property or nuisance
could prohibit the development of wetlands.9 3 If so, then the right to
fill the wetlands did not "inhere in the title to begin with," and
therefore, pursuant to Lucas, proscription of the right would be
noncompensable. In a cursory discussion of the issue, the court in
Loveladies concluded that, under New Jersey law, no nuisance principle

185. Id.; see also Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 318 (1991).
186. See Forest Props., 39 Fed. CI. at 74.
187. See id. at 75-81.
188. Loveladies Harbor Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
189. Id. at 1181-82.
190. Id.at 1183.
191. Id. at 1181.
192. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1055 n.19 (1992) (quoting W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 86, at 616 (5th ed.

1984)).
193.

Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1182.
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prohibited the development of wetlands." 4
95 the court surveyed Florida law
Similarly, in Florida Rock Industries,"
to determine whether the plaintiff's limestone mining operation
would constitute a nuisance. 6 The court noted that the operation
would result in pollution of a wetland. 97 Yet, while the Clean Water
Act may prohibit such pollution, Florida nuisance law, rather than
federal environmental law, was dispositive in the takings context.'98 In
concluding that Florida law placed no common-law prohibition on
mining, the court, citing Lucas, placed particular weight on the fact
that the mining had "long been engaged in by similarly situated
owners," and that authorities "permitted [the other landowners] to
continue the use denied to the claimant."1 9 Because the court found
that Florida nuisance law would not have precluded plaintiffs' mining
operation or its resulting pollution, it concluded that the plaintiffs had
a "compensable property interest in its right to mine limestone." 0
The message of Lucas and its progeny is clear-government may
not require property owners to leave their land in its natural state
without payment of just compensation.20 ' In fact, in Lucas, Justice
Scalia pointed to the frequent exercise of statutory condemnation
power to prevent development on private scenic lands as indicative of
"the practical equivalence in this setting of negative regulation and
appropriation."
Lucas manifests the Supreme Court's commitment
to the Western European tradition of adherence to a "transformative
economy," where private property is king.09 Accordingly, economic
productivity determines the value of property, not the property's
natural beauty, or its ecological importance. Thus, where government
Property
regulation eradicates economic viability, a taking occurs.
left in its natural state is valueless in the eyes of takings law. While the
Court's refusal to embrace "the economy of nature" by attaching legal
significance to non-economic values of property came as a bane to
environmentalists, 0 5 it may be a boon to western water users fed up
with invasive environmental legislation.

194. Id. at 1183.
195. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 21 (1999).
196. Id. at 28-31.
197. Id. at 30.
198. Id. at 29.
199. Id. at 30 (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992)).
200. Id. at 31. Compare Colorado Wild, Inc. v. United States Forest Service, 122 F.
Supp. 2d 1190 (D. Colo. 2000).
201. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018-19 (1992); Cf Albert Gidari,
The Economy of Nature, Private Property, and the Endangered Species Act, 6 FORDHAM ENvTL.
L.J. 661 (1995).
202. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
203. See Gidari, supra note 201, at 662 (citation omitted).
204. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
205. SeeJoseph L. Sax, Property Rights and theEconomy of Nature: UnderstandingLucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433 (1993); Richard J. Lazarus,
Puttingthe Correct "Spin" on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1421 (1993).
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IV. THE TAKING OF A WATER RIGHT
Let us first set the stage with a simple hypothetical. In order to
irrigate his crops, a senior appropriator holds an 1879 water right
permitting him to divert ten c.f.s. from one of Colorado's many
overappropriated streams. One summer, the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service ("USFWS") contacts our appropriator. Apparently,
USFWS found an endangered fish downstream of his diversion. The
USFWS claims that if our appropriator continues to divert water from
the stream at a rate of ten c.f.s., he will "take" the fish in violation of
section 9 of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). Negotiations with
the USFWS have failed, no incidental take permit has issued, and
consequently, our appropriator wishes to bring suit, claiming that the
ESA, as administered by USFWS, has worked a taking of his water right
without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. One
can imagine a myriad of variations on this basic theme, some of which
this Part will discuss below.
As an initial matter, we can summarily dispose of the theory that
protection of threatened species is not a public purpose, and hence a
violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court's expansive
conception of governmental action that constitutes a public purpose
forecloses any chance of success along these lines. Thus, our
appropriator can pursue compensation under three basic theories. He
can: (1) assert a physical invasion of his water right; (2) assert a total
economic deprivation of his property interest; or (3) claim a partial
regulatory taking under the Penn Central balancing test. Under each
theory, the pro property rights, pro appropriation holding of the
Colorado Supreme Court in Emmert is likely to be integral.
As discussed, supra in Part III.A, application of the balancing test is
the least predictable and least likely to result in compensation. Hence,
if possible, our appropriator should pursue compensation under the
categorical takings theories.
A. PHYSICAL INVASION OF A WATER RIGHT

A physical invasion of tangible real property is the quintessential
taking. ° Unlike the often fuzzy line separating a permissible exercise
of the police power from a regulatory taking, physical appropriation is
easily recognizable. Consequently, the physical invasion doctrine has
remained a stalwart element of Supreme Court takings
jurisprudence. °7 However, a water right as discussed, supra in Part
III.B, is usufructuary. Thus, the question arises:8 can one suffer a
physical invasion of an incorporeal hereditament?
206. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014-15; Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165,
1184 (1967).
207. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426-27 (1982).
208. Professor Grant concludes that "no definitive answer exists." Grant, supra note
18, at 430. However, Nixon v. United States, answered this question in the affirmative
holding that
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Supreme Court precedent suggests that governmental action could
result in the "physical invasion" of a water right and thus require
compensation. Causby v. United States demonstrates that the physical
appropriations doctrine is not limited to the occupation of land but is
applicable to other property interests as well. °9 Regardless of the kind
of property interest at stake, a physical invasion occurs where, as in our
hypothetical, the United States commits "an intrusion so immediate
and direct as to subtract from the owner's
full enjoyment of the
210
it."
of
exploitation
his
limit
to
and
property
Per Emmert, the two primary sticks in the bundle of rights that
constitute a Colorado water right are priority and use. " In our
hypothetical, by appropriating our senior's allotment of water to the
federal government's own purpose, the protection of an endangered
species, the federal government necessarily prohibits our senior from
applying his decreed volume of water to a beneficial
use,
2 2
notwithstanding his state constitutional right to the contrary. ,
Not only has the government obliterated our senior's right to use
the water, but it has also breached the security provided by his priority
date-a security which serves as the primary source of a water right's
value. 3 Unlike reserved rights, which avoid this problem by acquiring
a priority date as of the creation of the reservation, 214 governmental
appropriation of water for the protection of endangered species has
no associated priority date superseding that of the appropriator.
Disregarding an appropriator's date of priority is analogous to
proscribing a landowner's (or pond owner's) right to exclude, a right
which the Supreme Court found so fundamental in Kaiser Aetna.' 5
Thus, by ignoring our senior's priority date and prohibiting him from
using his decreed water, the government's action has not "simply
take[n] a single 'strand' from the 'bundle' of property rights:216it [has]
chop[ped] through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand."
Finally, the federal government has exercised "complete
[t]he one incontestable case for compensation (short of formal
expropriation) seems to occur when the government deliberately brings it
about that its agents, or the public at large, "regularly use," or "permanently"
occupy, space or a thing which theretofore was understood to be under
private ownership ....
fT]hing" encompasses "any discrete, identifiable
(even if incorporeal) vehicle of economic value which one can conceive of as
being owned.
978 F.2d 1269, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness:Comments on the EthicalFoundationsof 'Just Compensation"Law, 80 HARv. L. REV.
1165, 1184 n.37 (1967)). But cf United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 62 n.9
(1989) (holding that to allow money to be eligible for the physical invasion category
"would be an extravagant extension of Loretto").
209. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265 (1946).
210. Id. at 265.
211. See supra Part II.C.
212. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
213. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
214. SeeWinters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
215. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
216. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982).
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dominion" over our senior's water right. He no longer has control
over the "timing, extent, or nature of the invasion."" 7 Thus, our
appropriator has suffered the "special kind of injury" the Supreme
Court referred to in Loretto that requires compensation without
exception." 8
There are, however, some reasons to doubt the applicability of the
physical invasion doctrine to the taking of a water right. First, one
popular formulation of the rule states that a physical invasion of the
owner's property occurs when the government practically ousts the
Yet, a water right provides not a right to
owner from possession.
possess but a right to use. ° Second, the Supreme Court, in Kaiser
Aetna, suggested that although the character of the governmental
action was still extremely serious, the requirement of an easement of
passage did not constitute a per se taking as it was not a physical
occupation of land. 22' A court could extend this reasoning to preclude
application of the physical invasion doctrine to the taking of a water
right. Finally, the suggestion in Loretto that only a permanent physical
occupation is eligible for treatment as per se taking could prove
troublesome to our senior appropriator. If USFWS appropriated our
senior's water for only half the irrigation season, it could mount a valid
argument that a permanent physical invasion had not occurred,
notwithstanding our farmer's fallow fields. However, as discussed
supra in Part III.B, a court must read Loretto in light of First English.222
Moreover, even if the temporary nature of the proscription caused an
analysis of the physical appropriation claim under the balancing test,
the serious
character of the governmental action would still carry great
22 3
weight.

On balance, Loretto, Causby, and Kaiser Aetna indicate that our
appropriator may be entitled to compensation under the physical
invasion branch of Supreme Court takings jurisprudence. If the courts
refuse to treat our hypothetical as a physical invasion, the above
arguments will still be relevant under the balancing test. Before
pursuing compensation under the balancing test though, our senior
appropriator should first seek compensation under the second "brightline test" by arguing that the USFWS's administration of the ESA has
denied him "all
224 economically beneficial or productive use" of his
property right.

B.

LUCASANALYSIS

If, as some commentators have suggested, the true import of Lucas
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 436.
Id.
Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878).
See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 433.
See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
223. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
224. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
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and its progeny is that the State may not require property be left in its
natural state without the payment of just compensation,"' one can
hardly imagine a more consummate example of a taking than our
hypothetical. Without the enabling effect of the appropriations
doctrine, the West would be a "worthless" wilderness. The value of
western water is not its natural beauty or ecological significance, but its
economic potential. A regulation that proscribes all economic value of
a property interest in favor of natural preservation is precisely the type
of overreaching act struck down by the Supreme Court in Lucas. Thus,
if USFWS's protection of an endangered fish renders our senior
appropriator's water right valueless by requiring that the water be left
in its natural state, the government must compensate him for his loss.
As a formal matter, under Lucas, our appropriator must establish that
(1) "the proscribed use interests were.., part of his title to begin
with," 26 and (2) the governmental regulation has rendered his water
right valueless. 7
1. Inherent Limitations on a Water Right
i.

Property Law

In the context of a water right, whether a taking has occurred
depends heavily on the balance between private use and public
ownership.22 8 A strong history of state control over water allocation
may inherently limit an appropriator's right to use water.2 9 Thus, in
Wyoming, where the state allocates water pursuant to a permit system230
and incorporates the public interest into the issuing decision, a
strong case exists for concluding that appropriative rights are
subordinate to public ownership interests. Hence, a court could
conceivably conclude that the right to use water in a way contrary to
the public interest was not part of an appropriator's right. Similarly, in
California, the broad interpretation and application of the public trust
interest
doctrine may warrant a determination
232 that public
considerations inherently limit water rights.
In contrast, Colorado has historically exhibited only minimal
First, Emmert's interpretation of
control over water allocation.2 "
sections 5 and 6 of Article XVI of the Colorado Constitution supports
an absence of inherent public interest limitations on private

225. See Sax, supra note 205.
226. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
227. See id. at 1030.
228. See supra Part II.C.
229. Id.
230. See Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961).
231. See Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-503, 41-3-930 to -932 (Michie 1999).
232. The California example raises the related issue of ascertaining the proper point
in time that state law should be surveyed for "inherent limitations on title." See supra
Part IV.C. 1.
233. See supraPart II.C.
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appropriative rights."' According to Emmert, although section 5 states
that water is the property of the public, such ownership is for the
purposes of appropriation and one cannot reasonably construe this
section as limiting the property right of appropriators.235 Moreover,
unlike Wyoming, California, and a number of other western states,
Colorado does not consider public interest factors in decreeing water
rights.2 36 Finally, Colorado appears to have rejected the public trust
doctrine. 3 7 Collaboratively, these factors lead to the inevitable
interests currently do not limit the
conclusion that inherent public
238
right.
water
Colorado
a
to
title
Only the in-stream flow statute 239 and the doctrine of optimal
utilization provide any hint to the contrary. 20 The in-stream flow
statute, however, while allowing appropriation for a public interest
purpose, only permits the establishment of in-stream flow rights under
The Colorado Water
the prior appropriations doctrine.
Conservation Board must purchase the water needed to augment instream flows and must wait in line just like any other junior
Because the statute ensures the protection of existing
appropriator.
water rights, it cannot serve as a source of inherent limitations on the
title to Colorado water rights. Optimal utilization, on the other hand,
may provide a court the opening it needs to "objectively apply its
precedent" to conclude that inherent public interests limit
appropriative rights under Colorado law.243 But, in order to serve as
the foundation of such a limitation,2 the
44 doctrine would probably have
to evolve beyond its current infancy.
Finally, some would argue that the state's unquestionable authority
to proscribe waste without compensation supports constitutionally
permissible curtailments of appropriations on public interest grounds.
234. See supranotes 75-81 and accompanying text.
235. See supranote 81 and accompanying text.
236. See supraPart II.C.
237. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
238. This could change over time in which case one would be forced to address
timing issues. See supra Part III.C.1.
239. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2000).
240. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
241. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102 (2000).
242. See id.
243. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
244. The simple assertion that "'maximum utilization' does not require a 'singleminded endeavor to squeeze every drop of water' from a water source" along with the
fact that the state engineer should promulgate rules that seek to achieve "optimum
use" of the resource are, in the author's opinion, simply not enough to overcome
Lucas's limitations on interpretation. Bell &Johnson, supra note 5, at 17-18; Lucas v.
S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031-32 (1992) (application of relevant
precedent must be objectively reasonable); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v.
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980) ("[A] State by ipse dixit, may not transform private
property into public property without compensation"); Alamosa-La Jara Water Users
Prot. Ass'n v. Gould, 674 P.2d 914, 935 (Colo. 1983); Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d
986, 994 (Colo. 1968); see also Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994)
(Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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This may just be another way of conceptualizing the optimal utilization
argument. In any event, the prohibition on waste has traditionally
served the interest of private appropriators, not endangered fish." s
Consequently, this argument is probably without merit." 6 On balance,
a court would likely conclude that Colorado property law does not
place 24any
inherent public interest limitations on appropriative water
7
rights.

ii.

Nuisance Law

Predicting the likelihood that a court will find inherent limitations
in appropriative rights under Colorado nuisance law is a more risky
endeavor. In Colorado, "one has no property right in a nuisance, or in
property that is used in maintaining" a nuisance.21' Thus, Colorado
nuisance law dovetails nicely with the Lucas framework. However, only
State v. The Milf 49 and ColoradoDivision of Wildlife v. Cox are instructive
regarding the extent Colorado's nuisance law applies to appropriative
245. See supra text accompanying note 98.
246. The author concedes the requirement to a beneficial use without waste could
eventually be interpreted to prohibit appropriations which have a detrimental impact
on wildlife. Such prohibition could be achieved judicially by claiming that such an
appropriation is either non-beneficial or wasteful. However, current Colorado water
law does not support such a holding. If a court addressing a takings challenge were to
so hold, it would likely be a violation ofJustice Scalia's requirement that a court find
inherent limitations on title pursuant to an "objectively reasonable" application of
precedent. See supra text accompanying note 163. Before use as the basis of an
inherent limitation on one's title, the doctrine must be permitted to evolve to a point
which supports its use as such.
247. Interestingly, as discussed above, one cannot say the same with regard to water
rights perfected under Wyoming law or California law. Thus, an interesting dilemma
presents itself. Because Lucas predicates a taking on the historical treatment of a
property right under State law, and property law varies from state to state, the degree
of protection afforded an interest by the Fifth Amendment will also vary from state to
state. Some commentators question the legitimacy of a takings analysis under which
"the Constitution [means] different things in different places." Fisher, supranote 164,
at 1401.
One cannot be as sure of this conclusion if our basic hypothetical is slightly
altered. A water right is treated as both real and personal property. See supra text
accompanying notes 57-59. Specifically, water stored in an off-stream reservoir is
treated as personal property. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. Now assume
that, instead of our basic hypothetical, our appropriator diverts water from the stream
for storage in an off-stream reservoir and the endangered fish is found in this
reservoir. Also, assume the USFWS is trying to protect the endangered fish by
prohibiting our appropriator from lowering the level of the reservoir. In Lucas, Justice
Scalia stated that "in the case of personal property... [an owner] ought to be aware of
the possibility that new regulation might even render his property economically
worthless." Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992). Under
Supreme Court takings jurisprudence, the mere fact that water in an off-stream
reservoir is treated as personal property may permit regulatory proscription of its
economic value. One commentator has even suggested thatJustice Scalia's reasoning
concerning personal property may be extended to water rights in states with a
sufficiently high degree of control over water allocation. See Grant, supra note 18, at
431.
248. Gaskins v. People, 272 P. 662, 664 (Colo. 1928).
249. State v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1994).
250. Colo. Div. of Wildlife v. Cox, 843 P.2d 662 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
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water rights. In The Mill, the owner of a uranium-contaminated mill
site brought a takings claim after extensive regulation drastically
reduced the potential economic return of his property.2 5 The court
rejected the takings claim primarily because the only economically
viable use for the property constituted a nuisance, and under
Colorado law, a court can proscribe nuisances without
compensation. 52 The court generally defined nuisance as "the doing
or failure to do something that injuriously affects the safety, health, or
morals of the public or works some substantial annoyance,
inconvenience, or injury to the public." 252 Specifically, the court stated
that "land uses that cause pollution constitute a nuisance., 25 4 In Cox,
the Division of Wildlife brought an action to enjoin a landowner from
harboring exotic wildlife on his property. 255 The relevant aspect of Cox
is the court's holding that the trial court did not err in defining public
nuisance as the use of property in a manner detrimental to native
wildlife.256
Under the circumstances of our hypothetical, The Mill's expansive
definition of a public nuisance could potentially include our senior
appropriator's continued diversion. Our senior's diversion is not
under Colorado law, however, a use of property which causes
pollution. 257 Thus, a significant chance exists that The Mill's definition

.251. See The Mill, 887 P.2d at 997-99.
252. See id. at 1002.
253. Id.
254. Id. (citing Wilmore v. Chain O'Mines, 44 P.2d 1024, 1027 (1934)) ("Whatever
rights might be claimed by the defendant owners, they cannot justify the claim of a
right to pollute the stream").
255. See Cox, 843 P.2d at 663.
256. Id. at 664.
257. But cf Ralph W. Johnson, Water Pollution and the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVrL.
L. 485 (1989); Sax, supra note 22, at 271-74. Professors Johnson and Sax equate
appropriators with polluters in which case state nuisance law prohibiting pollution
would apply to appropriators whose diversions have a negative effect on stream
ecology. Sax, supra note 22, at 271-73. For instance, Professor Sax argues that
suffocating a fish and poisoning a fish are essentially the same. Id. at 273.
Professor Sax, however, apparently overlooks the fact that although one cannot
obtain a property right to pollute, appropriators have a state constitutional right to
divert water from Colorado's streams. See COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6. In fact, "[t]he
system of water quality regulation in Colorado reflects a continued conflict with and
subordination to the prior appropriation system." City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation
Co., 926 P.2d 1, 91 (Colo. 1996). "The Colorado legislature has 'made clear its
intention that [the Water Quality Agencies'] authority cannot be exercised in a
manner that significantly compromises the appropriative rights of present or future
Colorado Wild, Inc. v. United States Forest Service 122 F. Supp. 2d
water users.'
1190, 1192 (D. Colo. 2000) (quoting City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d
1, 92 (Colo. 1996)). In Colorado Wild, Judge Brimmer flatly refused to equate an
appropriation of water that increases pollution concentrations in a stream to a
discharge of pollution into that stream. See id. at 1193. One need only to recall the
reasoning of Florida Rock Industries to evaluate the potential impact of this holding in
the takings context. See supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text. Accordingly, he
held that a withdrawal of water from the North Fork that increases pollution
concentrations in the Snake River does not violate either the Clean Water Act or state
water quality standards. See id.
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of nuisance could exclude our appropriator's actions. Similarly,
although a reading of Cox could prohibit our senior's continued
diversion on the grounds of public nuisance, the facts are entirely
distinguishable."'8 In contrast, Loveladies' and Florida Rock Industries
treatment of the nuisance issue indicates that our senior's continued
diversion would not constitute a nuisance."5' And although those cases
did not apply Colorado law, their reasoning seems quite relevant
especially when considered in conjunction with Judge Brimmer's
recent analysis in Colorado Wild, Inc., v. United States Forest Service.2 °
Finally, Scalia's acknowledgment that changed circumstances could
potentially transform a previously permissible use into a nuisance
results in further uncertainty, especially where changing social values
are concerned.26' On balance, some leeway in Colorado nuisance law
exists that could allow a court to find an inherent limitation on
appropriators' rights by the reasonably objective application of
relevant precedent.
2.

Valueless?

In order for the Lucas framework to apply, the Court must also
determine that the government's regulation leaves the owner's
property valueless. 62 As discussed in Part III.C.3 and Forest Properties,
this inquiry raises the denominator problem. In our hypothetical, the
actions of USFWS can appropriate either all or part of our senior's
water right. If they choose to proscribe the entire ten c.f.s. right, the
denominator problem appears to be a non-issue. Although a cursory
analysis indicates that the remaining economic value of the water right
is zero, this is not necessarily the case.
For instance, assume that our senior's appropriation is located
high on a tributary to the Colorado River. The only habitat USFWS
seeks to protect is the five miles of stream directly below our diversion
where the endangered fish reproduces. USFWS's appropriation of our
senior's ten c.f.s. water right serves only to maintain stream flows in
that five-mile section of stream. Consequently, our senior still has the
option to sell his water right to the thousands of appropriators
downstream from the endangered fish's habitat. Thus, a legitimate
argument exists that USFWS's appropriation of our senior's water did
not reduce the economic value of his right to zero because he retains
the right to sell it. Hence, the problem of conceptual severance arises.
Under these facts, one should probably analyze USFWS's actions
under the Penn Central balancing test unless the court perceives the
258. For instance, the definition of public nuisance in Cox derived from a
Department of Natural Resources Regulation governing exotic wildlife and is,
therefore, of only limited precedential value.
259. See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
260. See Colorado Wild, Inc. v. United States Forest Service 122 F. Supp. 2d 1190,
1192 (D. Colo. 2000); supra notes 193-200, 257.
261. Such a transformation would also necessitate resolution of the timing issue. See
supra text accompanying notes 154-59.
262. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
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"right to use" as a distinct property interest, the value of which has
been reduced to zero. 63 One could also imagine circumstances where
prohibiting an appropriator from using his water would not leave him
with the option to sell it, for instance where the appropriator is located
on the state line. 64
If USFWS proscribes only five c.f.s. of our senior's ten c.f.s. right,
the resolution of the issue is equally unclear. On one hand, if the
court uses a denominator of ten, our appropriator maintains 50% of
the economic value of his water right, and hence a court would analyze
his takings claim under the Penn Centralbalancing test.26 5 On the other
hand, if the court uses a denominator of five, total economic
2
deprivation has occurred and the Lucas framework applies.
Assuming our appropriator acquired the entire water right at the same
a7
time, application of the Forest Properties framework would suggest
balancing test.26
the
under
resolution
hence
and
ten,
of
denominator
However, the ultimate resolution of this issue is far from clear and
either result is equally plausible.
A third solution may serve as an appropriate compromise in
resolving the denominator problem in the context of the prior
appropriations doctrine. If the denominator is to be determined
pursuant to "how the owner's reasonable expectations have been
shaped by the State's law of property, 261 then the fundamentals of the
prior appropriations doctrine should evidence the proper
denominator. Beneficial use [is] the basis, measure, and limit of a
Colorado water right.269 Thus, determination of the denominator
could depend on either the amount of water beneficially used by the
appropriator or alternatively, the amount historically consumed by the
appropriator.
The denominator problem can also arise in a slightly different
context, most aptly described as temporal conceptual severance.
Suppose that USFWS only wishes to curtail or proscribe our senior
appropriator's water right during dry years, thus preserving the
instream flow for the benefit of the endangered fish at the most crucial
time. On the one hand, the federal government would argue that the
proscription does not reduce the value of the water right to zero
because it does not affect the appropriator's right to apply the water to
a beneficial use every other year. However, pursuant to First English,

263. Incidentally, in the author's opinion, our senior would stand an excellent
chance of winning under the balancing test on these facts. One can hardly imagine a
greater interference with investment backed expectations than when the owner of
private property is forced to sell that property.
264. Even then it is possible that a valuable in-stream use of the water would remain.
265. See supraPart III.C.3.
266. See id.
267. See supra notes 180-87 and accompanying text.
268. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 n.7 (1992).
269. Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 53 (Colo.
1999).
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the government must compensate even a temporary taking ° Our
senior, therefore, would argue that the value of his water right
attributable to the specific irrigation season in question has indeed
been reduced to zero-his ditch is dry, his fields fallow. Consequently,
under FirstEnglish, he should be entitled to compensation.
One can resolve the issue on broader doctrinal grounds as well.
According to Justice Scalia, "[t]he answer to this difficult question may
lie in how the owner's reasonable expectations have been shaped by
the State's law of property."271 Accordingly, one should first look to the
prior appropriations doctrine itself to resolve issues of conceptual
severance. At the core of the prior appropriations doctrine is its
central tenet: "first in time, first in right." The certainty provided by
this principle affords senior appropriators security in their
investments. Priority then, and the security provided thereby, is the
primary source of a water right's value.
By requisitioning our
senior's water, albeit only during dry years, the USFWS nullifies the
security of an early priority date and thereby eliminates the value of
the right. Consequently, it would be proper to analyze USFWS's
appropriation under these circumstances pursuant to Lucas's
categorical framework.
3.

Unanswered Questions

Applying Supreme Court takings jurisprudence to the taking of a
water right creates some issues that have yet to be resolved.
Federal Regulation versus State Regulation
2
The historical development of the prior appropriations doctrine
in conjunction with Forest Properties'admonition that federal law should
not be considered in assessing whether a pre-existing limitation on the
claimant's title exists, 74 suggest that one should treat a regulatory
taking by the federal government differently than a regulatory taking
by the state government. Accordingly, whereas justifying inherent state
limitations on appropriative rights is difficult, finding grounds on
which to base inherent federal limitations is essentially impossible
because water allocation has traditionally proceeded exclusively under
state law.275 On the other hand, it could be that an inherent limitation
i.

270. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 313-22 (1987).
271. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7
272. See Navajo Dev. Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374, 1380 (Colo. 1982).
273. See supra Part II.A.
274. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. But see LAITOS, supra note 158, at §
4.03[B]-[C] ("[W]hen federal law, as opposed to the state police power, affects private
property, a court need not rely exclusively on state positive law to ascertain the
meaning of the property interest. Normative images of property may be acceptable
then, because the state's positive law limits only the state police power, not an exercise
of federal power").
275. But see infra Part III.B.3.ii (discussing the federal government's traditional
interest in navigable waters).
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on appropriative rights stemming from historic state regulation is
sufficient to uphold the federal regulation as a noncompensable
taking. Apparently, case law or legal scholarship has yet to address this
issue.
ii.

Navigable versus Non-Navigable

United States v. Chandler-DunbarCompany teaches that "the running
water in a great navigable stream is [incapable] of private
ownership. 2 16 Yet, the Colorado Constitution provides that the State
shall never deny the right to appropriate water.2 77 Although the
navigation servitude of the federal government is well established
under federal law, 278 and hence an inherent federal limitation on the
title to water rights in navigable streams, 7 9 Forest Propertiesinstructs us
8
to look only to state law in ascertaining inherent limitations on title.
Thus, this aspect of the Lucas framework is inconsistent with the
doctrinal development surrounding the navigation servitude.
Additionally, assuming that the navigation servitude serves as an
inherent limitation on appropriative rights in navigable waters, is this
limitation sufficient to allow the federal government to proscribe such
fish?28'
a right noncompensably in order to protect an endangered
Fortunately, though, this issue is unlikely to arise in Colorado; it is
generally assumed that all of the state's waters are non-navigable. 82

276. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979) (quoting United States
v. Chandler-Dunbar Co. 229 U.S. 53, 69 (1913)); see also United States v. Twin City
Twin City held that "because the 'navigation
Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
servitude' of the United States gives it a paramount right at any time to divert or
obstruct the flow of such waters, no one could form any valid expectation of the flow,
and such an expectation, therefore, could never give rise to a compensable value."
Michelman, supra note 206, at 1231.
277. See COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
278. See KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 173.
279. See id.
280. See Forest Props., Inc. v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 56, 70-71 (1997).
281. This basic question arises in a number of contexts. Essentially, the uncertainty
boils down to this: where an inherent limitation on title is found, (e.g., navigation
servitude, prohibition on waste, the requirement of a reasonably efficient means of
diversion, optimal use, etc.), to what extent can it serve as the basis of
noncompensable governmental regulation? The text accompanying this footnote
serves as an example. Can the navigation servitude serve as the inherent limitation
which allows the government to take a water right to protect endangered fish without
paying compensation? In the author's opinion, the answer to this question must be
no. Inherent limitations on title are inextricably tied to the expectations of private
property owners, see Epstein, supra note 174, and no reasonable appropriator would
expect the navigation power to support a curtailment of their rights under the
Endangered Species Act. This uncertainty is probably the reason Justice Scalia sought
to limit a state court's ability to interpret its own precedent by requiring that relevant
precedent be objectively applied.
282. See In re German Ditch & Reservoir Co., 139 P. 2, 9 (Colo. 1913); Stockman v.
Leddy, 129 P. 220, 222 (Colo. 1912) (overruled on other grounds); VRANESH, supra
note 49, at 128 n.631. Cf VRANESH, supra note 48, at 130 n. 639.
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V. CONCLUSION
For the better part of this century, a landowner wishing to sue the
government for taking his property without just compensation has
faced an uncertain task. In analyzing the taking of a water right, the
application of a real property based takings framework to the
proscription of a usufructuary right only compounds this uncertainty.
The resulting conceptual discord creates issues that ultimately only the
United States Supreme Court can answer. Nevertheless, the historical
development of the prior appropriations doctrine, Colorado property
law, and Supreme Court takings precedent provide clues to how some
of these issues are likely to be resolved. As to others, we can only
speculate. For now the only prediction one can make with any degree
of certainty is that the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment entitles a
Colorado appropriator to compensation where federal regulation
reduces the value of a water right, located on a non-navigable stream,
to zero.

